

Abstract. This article argues that in its reading of the passage of *Metaphysics* VI.1.1026a30-31, in which Aristotle presents the difficulty of reconciling the universality of the first philosophy and that it deals with the first substance and affirms this science is universal **because** first. Aquinas uses the principle that the first and usually of a genre are studied in the same investigation, connected with the claim that the first thing a genus is the cause of it, and that a science competent to study both the subject and the causes of their subject. Accordingly, the passage should not necessarily be interpreted as implying that **from** knowledge of the first substance, knowledge of everything else is given, merely stating that since the first philosophy deals with the first substance rightfully should also explore the ordinary. This view Aquino's comment and is an alternative to the position of Wippel, who argues that Thomas looks puzzled Aristotle's text, which is limited to expose but such exposure does not involve his own position.

Keywords: Aristotle - Thomas Aquinas - Wippel - first philosophy - universal science.

